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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contempt of Court-Civil or Criminal
The two types of contempt proceedings recognized in the United
States are criminal and civil.1 Criminal contempt proceedings are those
brought to preserve the power and to vindicate the dignity of the court
and to punish disobedience of its processes and orders.2 Usually they
are separate and independent proceedings at law, with the public on one
side and the respondent on the other.3 The purpose of the sentence in
such proceedings is punitive as it is in the public interest to vindicate
the authority of the court and to deter other like derelictions.4 On the
other hand, civil contempt proceedings are those instituted to preserve
and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedi-
ence to orders and decrees made for the benefit of such parties.5 These
proceedings are remedial and coercive in their nature, and the parties
chiefly interested in their conduct and prosecution are those individuals
for the enforcement of whose private rights and remedies the suits were
instituted. 6
This distinction between the two types of contempt has been recog-
nized in North Carolina. The North Carolina Supreme Court said in
Galyon v. Stutts:
7
"With us contempts are defined and classified generally by
two statutes: G. S. 5-1 and G. S. 5-8. These statutes recognize
'Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 111 (1924); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey
Company, 194 U. S. 324, 328 (1904); Boylan v. Detrio, 187 F. 2d 375, 378 (5th
Cir. 1951); Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946) ; In re
Nevitt, 177 Fed. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902); Blackard v. Arkansas, 217 Ark. 661,
664, 232 S. W. 2d 977, 979 (1950); State ex tel. Jones v. Miller, 147 Kan.
242, 243, 75 P. 2d 239, 240 (1938); Marcum v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 1, 6,
113 S. W. 2d 462, 465 (1938) ; Holt v. McLaughlin, 357 Mo. 844, 845, 210 S. W.
2d 1006, 1007 (1948) ; Swanson v. Swanson, 10 N. J. Super. 513, -, 77 A. 2d 477,
480 (1950); Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N. M. 640, 643, 139 Pac. 154, 156 (1914);
Bridges v. Oklahoma, 9 Okla. Crim. 450, 452, 132 P. 503, 504 (1913); Lief v.
Lief, 14 N. J. Misc. 27, -, 178 Atl. 762, 763 (1935) ; O'Brien v. State ex rel. Bibb,
26 Tenn. App. 270, 273, 170 S. W. 2d 931, 932 (1942) ; Local 333B, United Marine
Division of International Longshoreman's Ass'n. v. Virginia Ferry Corp., 193 Va.
773, 779, 71 S. E. 2d 159, 163 (1952).
-Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946). See also, 17 C. J. S.
Contempt § 5 (1939).
'Ex parte Grossman, 276 U. S. 87, 111 (1924).
"Blackward v. Arkansas, 217 Ark. 661, 664, 232 S. W. 2d 977, 979 (1950).
'Ex parte Joe L. Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 314, 95 So. 755, 760 (1923) ; Marcum
v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 1, 6, 113 S. W. 2d 462, 465 (1938); Galyon v.
Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954). See also, 12 Am. Jim.
Contempt § 6 (1938).
7241 N. C. 120, 124, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and preserve the fundamental distinction between civil and crim-
inal contempt in substance but not in name. Acts or omissions
which ordinarily constitute criminal contempt as defined in the
textbooks are designated by our statute (G. S. 5-1) as punish-
able 'for contempt,' without further designation; the acts or
omissions which ordinarily constitute civil contempt as defined
in the books are designated by our statute (G. S. 5-8) as punish-
able 'as for contempt.' Thus, under our statutes the proceedings
for criminal and civil contempt are 'for contempt' and 'as for
contempt,' respectively."
In an earlier case,8 the North Carolina Supreme Court had this to
say:
"A person guilty of any of the acts or omissions enumerated in
the eight subsections of G. S. § 5-1 may be punished for con-
tempt because such acts or omissions have a direct tendency
to interrupt the proceedings of the court or to impair the re-
spect due to its authority. A person guilty of any of the acts or
neglects catalogued in the seven subdivisions of G. S. § 5-8 is
punishable as for contempt because such acts or neglects tend
to defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice the rights or remedies
of a party to an action pending in court."
The statutes to be discussed in this note are N. C. General Statutes
§ 5-1, § 5-4, § 5-8 (1953). The pertinent subsection of G. S. § 5-1 is
subsection three, which reads as follows:
"Any person guilty of any of the following acts may be pun-
ished for contempt:
3. Wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by
any court."
The punishment for a violation of this statute is limited by G. S.
§ 5-4, which provides:
"Punishment for contempt for matters set forth in the pre-
ceding sections shall be by fine not to exceed two hundred and
fifty dollars, or imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or both,
in the discretion of the court."
The applicable subsection of G. S. § 5-8 is subsection two:
"Every court of record has power to punish as for contempt
when the act complained of was such as tended to defeat, impair,
impede or prejudice the rights or remedies of a party to an action,
then pending in court-
' Luther v. Luther, 234 N. C. 429, 431, 67 S. E. 2d 345, 347 (1951).
[Vol. 34
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2. Parties to suits, attorneys, and all other persons for the non-
payment of any sum of money ordered by such court in cases
where execution cannot be awarded for the collection of the
same."
Much confusion has arisen in the application of these statutes. The
statutes heve been applied by the lower courts and the attorneys to the
wrong situations. In several cases,9 the lower court has sentenced the
offender to imprisonment until he should comply with the court's orders.
The supreme court in considering these cases has said that the action
was brought under G. S. § 5-1, but in reversing on other grounds (lack
of evidence to show willful failure to comply with the court's orders),
the court has failed to mention that the sentences were in conflict with
G. S. § 5-4 which limits the imprisonment under G. S. § 5-1 to thirty
days. Probably the court failed to mention the conflict because it was
reversing on other grounds, but it is submitted that if it had discussed
it, or had said that the facts presented made out a situation under
G. S. § 5-8, punishment for which is not limited by G. S. § 5-4, some of
the confusion as to which statute to use would have been removed. It
was thought that this confusion would be cleared up by the court's state-
ment in Galyon v. Stutts,i0 in which the court indicated which statute
was applicable to which situation. But not all of this has been elim-
inated, as evidenced by the recent case of Basnight v. Basnight."i"
In that case a wife had been awarded one hundred dollars per
month as support for herself and her children. Her husband had failed
to make these support payments, and the wife instituted contempt pro-
ceedings to compel payment. The lower court found the husband guilty
of willfully and contumaciously failing to make the payments and sen-
tenced him to imprisonment until he should comply with the order.
Upon appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court split three to three
for reversal on the ground that the evidence did not make out the willful
and contumacious failure to pay, but reduced the sentence to thirty
days' imprisonment, saying that the sentence for contempt was limited
by G. S. § 5-4 to thirty days.
The action was to enforce payment of support. Many jurisdictions,' 2
' Lamm v. Lamm, 229 N. C. 248, 49 S. E. 2d 403 (1948) ; Smithwick v. Smith-
wick, 218 N. C. 503, 11 S. E. 2d 455 (1940) ; Vaughan v. Vaughan, 213 N. C.
189, 195 S. E. 351 (1938); West v. West, 199 N. C. 12, 153 S. E. 600 (1930).S2Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
11242 N. C. 645, 89 S. E. 2d 259 (1955).
12Robertson v. Alabama, 20 Ala. App. 514, -, 104 So. 561, 565 (1924);
Henderson v. Henderson, 86 Ga. App. 812, 814, 72 S. E. 2d 731, 733 (1952);
Perry v. Perry, 165 Ind. 67, 74 N. E. 609 (1905) ; Barrett v. Barrett, 287 Ky.
216, 220, 152 S. W. 2d 610, 613 (1941); Thomas v. Thomas, 132 Neb. 827, 830,
273 N. W. 483, 484 (1937) ; Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N. M. 640, 643, 139 Pac. 154,
154 (1914); Ex parte Bighorse, 178 Okla. 218, 219, 62 P. 2d 487, 489 (1936);
Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, 68 Utah 114, 208 P. 2d 1113 (1949) ;
19561
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including North Carolina,"3 have said that contempt proceedings for the
enforcement of alimony and support payments are civil rather than
criminal. This seems to be the logical proceeding as alimony and sup-
port are private rights secured by a court order for the benefit of the
wife or children,' 4 and, as noted above, the purpose of these contempt
proceedings is to enforce the private rights of parties to suits and to
compel obedience to the court's orders for the benefit of these parties.r
It was stated in the plaintiff's brief that the contempt proceeding had
been brought under G. S. § 5-1. It is submitted that the wife's in-
terests would have been better served if the contempt proceeding had
been brought under G. S. § 5-8.10 This statute has been said to embody
the textbook definition of civil contempt.' 7 The punishment for civil
contempt is usually imprisonment of an indefinite duration, that is, until
the offender shall comply with the court's order or process1s There-
fore, G. S. § 5-8 should have been used, as it is not limited in its pun-
ishment, and because an unlimited imprisonment has the desired co-
ercive effect, whereas a limited imprisonment only punishes the offender
who, upon completion of his sentence, cannot again be tried for con-
tempt for the same dereliction, as the prior action would be res judicata
in the second action.
Obviously the wife brought the contempt proceeding to coerce the
husband into paying the support rather than to punish him for his dis-
obedience of the court's order. In view of this fact, it is respectively
submitted that despite the apparent error of plaintiff's attorney in as-
serting that the contempt proceeding was under G. S. § 5-1, the court
should have ignored this contention, pointed out that the facts made
out a case under G. S. § 5-8, and affirmed the sentence of the lower
court. By so doing, the court would not only have more effectively re-
Simmons v. Simmons, 66 S. D. 76, 78, 278 N. W. 537, 538 (1938); Eddens v.
Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 523, 50 S. E. 2d 397, 403 (1949) ; Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va.
761, 95 S. E. 199 (1918). See also, 12 Am. JUR. Contempt § 6 (1938).
"Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N. C. 634, 197 S. E. 157 (1938).
"Cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 93 N. C. 418, 420 (1885). See also, 17 Am. Jun.
Divorce and Separation § 496 (1938).
" Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); Blackwood v.
Arkansas, 217 Ark. 661, 664, 232 S. W. 2d 977, 979 (1950) ; Cromartie v. Com-
missioner, 85 N. C. 211, 215 (1881).
20 It is assumed that the plaintiff was privileged to bring the action under
G. S. § 5-8 as it was stated in the plaintiff's brief that the husband did not own any
property upon which an execution would lie.
1 Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 123, 84 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1954).
21 Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); Chitwood v.
Eyman, 74 Ariz. 334, 343, 248 P. 2d 884, 890 (1952) ; Hervey v. Hervey, 186 Ark.
179, 52 S. W. 2d 963 (1932) ; State ex rel. Cash v. District Court of First Judicial
District, 78 Mont. 92, 95, 252 Pac. 388, 399 (1927) ; Delozier v. Bird, 123 N. C.
689, 694, 31 S. E. 834, 835 (1898) ; Cromartie v. Commissioner, 85 N. C. 211,
216 (1881) ; Hutchinson v. Canon, 6 Okla. 725, 55 Pac. 1077 (1898); Phillips v.
Phillips, 165 Wash. 616, 6 P. 2d 61 (1931).
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solved the rights of the litigants, but would have succeeded in clearing
up a considerable amount of the confusion which has so long existed in
this area.
SPENCER L. BLAYLOCK, JR.
Contracts-Conditional Acceptances-Variations in
the Construction of the Offeree's Language
There is uniform adherence to the rules that: (1) "To consummate
a valid contract an acceptance must be unequivocal and must not change,
add to or qualify the terms of the offer."' (2) Variations do not change,
add to or qualify the terms of the offer when additional language is
framed in words of request2 or when additional language merely recites
conditions implied in fact or in law from the offer.3 Paradoxically,
however, there seems to be little uniformity in the application of these
rules to individual cases in which the language, although not changing
the terms of the price, or nature of the subject matter of the contract,
does to some extent create contingencies. The following cases, all con-
cerned with transactions for the sale of real estate, with the exception
of one, are illustrative of this problem.
The phrase "subject to" has traditionally been a conditional ex-
pression.4 One court, in construing what it determined to be a con-
ditional acceptance said: "The meaning usually attributed to such
words as 'subject to' is that a promise that is so limited is a condi-
tional promise, one that is different from that for which the offeror
bargained." 5 However, in a recent North Carolina case, the court had
no difficulty in construing the defendant's use of "subject to" as a
phrase which did not affect the validity of an acceptance.0 Defendant
had used the following language in replying to plaintiff's offer. "Your
telegram... is accepted subject to details to be worked out by you and
[my lawyer]."' Defendant contended that his reply did not constitute
an acceptance because the language was conditional. The court decided
that the phrase "subject to details to be worked out . . ." was "an ex-
pression of hope or suggestion." s In the court's discussion may be found
1 Recent Cases, 20 GIN. L. REv. 68, 69 (1952).
2 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 79 (rev. ed. 1936).
Id. § 78.
'1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 61 (1950).
'Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, -, 266 P. 2d 856, 862
(1954).
' Carver v. Britt, 241 N. C. 538, 85 S. E. 2d 888 (1955).
'Id. at 539, 85 S. E. 2d at 889.
' Id. at 541, 85 S. E. 2d at 890. The court quoted as follows from 17 C. J. S.,
CONTRACTS at 384: "'If an offer is accepted as made, the acceptance is not con-
ditional and does not vary from the offer because of inquiries whether the offeror
will change his terms, or as to future acts, or by the expression of a hope, or
suggestion as to terms, or by the intimation that a time be fixed for the con-
19561
